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Resistance of Hammir of Ranthambore
In 1299 Alauddin had attacked Jaisalmer. However, the attack
on Jaisalmer was a mere raid as compared to the invasion of
Ranthambhor. Ranthambhor lies in the S.E. corner of Rajasthan.
It is situated on a rocky plateau, 1578 ft – above the sea
level. According to Amir Khusru, it was situated at a distance
of two week’s march from Delhi and was surrounded by a massive
wall three kos in circumference. In fact Ranthambore was the
first state to be selected for the trial of strength with the
Rajputs; firstly, because of its proximity to Delhi; secondly,
because of its reputed impregnability. Added to these were a
handy excuse and a justification. The Mongol rebels, Mauhammad
Shah and his brother Kehbru, the leaders of the mutiny near
Jalor, had been given shelter by the Rana of Ranthambhor.
Though contemporary historian gives this fact as a cause for
the invasion, circumstantial evidence supported by later
writings unmistakably does strengthen the hypothesis. At the
time of Alauddin’s invasion, Ranthambhor was ruled by the
Chauhan prince Hammir Deva, a direct descendant of renowned
Prithviraj. Muslim invaders had repeatedly tried to establish
their authority in Ranthambhor but without success. It was
attacked by Qutbuddin Aibak in 1209 and was captured by
Iltutmish in 1226, but it regained its independence soon
after. In 1291 Jalaluddin Khalji had marched against it but,
finding the fortress impregnable, had given up the idea of
capturing it. But Alauddin was made of a different stuff in
1300 he ordered his two generals. Ulugh Khan, governor of
Bayana and Nusrat Khan, governor of Kara, to invade
Ranthambhore with the forces at their command. The joint
armies moved towards the Rajput stronghold and on their way
captured and plundered Jhain without encountering any
resistance. Before arriving at Ranthambhor, Ulugh sent a
message to the Chauhan prince that his master bore no grudge
against the Rai and if the latter either put the fugitives to
death or surrendered them to him, the Imperial armies would
return to Delhi. He further argued that when his suppliants
had not proved faithful and loyal to the Delhi Sultan who had
given them life and honour, how could they be expected to
behave otherwise towards their new patron? In the end Hammira
was asked to be ready for consequences in case he refused to
act in accordance with the instructions contained in the
letter. But Hammir was not to be cowed down. Hammir Deva was
directly connected with Prithviraj Chauhan. He was the third
son of Jait Singh and because of meritorious record had
ascended the throne of Ranthambhor in 1282 in the lifetime of
his father. He declined – to betray his guests into the hands
of those who were determined to kill them. He sent word that
he did not want to court the Sultan’s enmity, but he was not
afraid of it either Nayachandra Suri writes in the Hammir
Mahakavya that the Rana’s fall was due to his wrong economic
policy. Rana had given an honorarium of two lacs besides large
jagirs to Muhammad Shah & Kehbru, and burden of this
liberality had weighed heavily on the people. Hammir Prabandha
also says that the Rana gave wealth and jagirs to Muhammad
Shah. To the gallant Chauhan, the promise of shelter to the
Mongol nobles as well as the ancient glory of his house formed
the severest justification for accepting the challenge of the
Muslim generals. Besides he was no ordinary king; he had
annexed to dominions as far off places as Shivapur in Gwalior
and Balvan in Kota. No wonder that Jalaluddin Khalji had
returned unsuccessful from Ranthambhor.
No sooner did Ulugh Khan receive Rana Hammir’s reply than he
ordered his army to march to the destination. He encamped in
the neighborhood of the fortress, and ordered construction of
entrenchments and batteries (gargach). Arrada, gargach,
marjniq and poshib frequently occur in the description of
warfare in the medieval period. The first three were stone –
throwing machines pashib raised a platform constructed by sand
and other materials to scale the walls of the fort. By this
time Hammir Deva had completed his preparation for defence.
Yahya estimates that the Rai had under his command 12,000
cavalry, many famous elephants and innumerable footmen.
According to Amir Khusru, the Raja had about 10,000 flee foot
horses. The Rajpus unceasingly sent forth missiles and Nasrat
Khan died at the main gate called Nawlakhi. The Muslim camp
went into mourning at the loss of such an able commander. Upon
this the valiant Rajputs, thinking the silence in the Imperial
camp as a sign of its having been overtaken by sense of a
defeat, relinggquished their defensive position, sallied forth
from the fort, and attacked the besiegers. Ulugh Khan could
not withstand impact of the onslaught and fell back on Jhain.
That Alauddin had underrated the strength of the Rajputs, was
clear to everybody. Ulugh Khan duly reported to the Sultan the
death of Nusrat Khan and the retreat of the army from
Ranthambhor, whereupon Alauddin decided to march in person to
the scene of action.
The Sultan left with a large army for Ranthambhor. On the way
an unsuccessful attempt was made on his life by his nephew
Ikat Khan. A little later, Umar Khan and Mangu Khan, rose in
revolt in Badaon and Avadh, and one Haji Maula started a
rebellion in Delhi. But undaunted by these events, Alauddin
marched on and arrived at Ranthambhor. The investment of
Ranthambhor had proved to be a long drawn out affair.
Meanwhile, a general like Nusrat Khan had perished, attempts
on the Sultan’s life had been made, and the empire had been
convulsed with a number of rebellions. And yet Alauddin’s
determination to take the fort had not faltered in the least.
The army was reduced to extreme distress, but not a single
soldier dared to desert the camp for fear of the Sultan’s
imposing a fine of three year’s pay upon him. The country
around had altogether been ruined; a sprit of despair had
begun to overtake the Imperial troops. Cut off from the
capital, the soldiery was certain in its belief that they were
destined to perish under the impregnable walls of Ranthambhor.
In secret Alauddin would deliberate with his confidential
nobles about the causes of the successive revolts and the
seriousness of the situation, but outwardly be showed as if
nothing of importance had happened, and pressed the siege with
great vigor. The soldiers tried to fill the moat with logs of
wood but these were burnt down by faggots hurled from the
fort. This device having failed, and finding it impossible to
reach the fort wall, the Sultan’s troops concentrated on
filling a small portion of the moat with sand and stone. When
bags fell shorts they used their trousers as bags and
succeeded in erecting a high mound, which almost reached the
turrets of the fort. But the defenders kept on throwing fire
and missiles and succeeded in keeping the enemy away from the
battlements for two or three weeks more. At last provisions
fell short in the fortress and, soon famine raged to such an
extent that one “grain” of rice could be purchased only for
two rattis of gold. According to Hammir Mahakavya, Sarjan Shab,
who bore enmity to Hammir, and who had been won over by
Alauddin, secretly placed cowhides in the provisions – store
and thus polluted the food – grains. ‘Man can bear every
atecation but that of a starving stomach’ says Amir Khusrau,
and the valiant Rajputs could not bear the pangs of hunger. In
the imperial camp, on the other hand, gold was distributed
freely among the troops to give them fresh incentive fight.
When nothing remained in the fort except hardship, despair and
starvation, the heroic act of Jauhar was performed. A blazing
fire was lit and the ladies of the Rai, headed by the chief
queen Ranga Devi, perished on pyre. The remnant of the Rajput
soldiery, their nobles and the king donned saffron garments
and dashed forth to engage the enemy in a last combat. A
detailed description of Hammir’s last fight is given in the
Rajput sources. According to Hammir Mahakavya, nine brave men
fought by his side in his last hour, his brother Viram, Tak
Gangadhar, foru Mongol (brothers), Kshetra Singh Parmar and
two others. After Viram had been killed and Muhammad Shah had
lost consciousness, Hammir advanced to fight. The battle raged
fiercely and blood flowed on all sides. Muhammad Shah and
Kehbru, greateful to the last to the Rajput king for his
hospitality and sacrifice, fought side by side with their
patron. At last the great Rana Hammir fell, fighting gallantly
on the field of battle, as yet in the prime of his life. Isami
asserts that none of the Rajaas family members was captured
alive.
The gallant fight and death of Rana Hammir has been attributed
by some writers to his persistence (Hammir Hath) but it must
be admitted that Hammir was one of those gallant sons of
Rajputana who fought valiantly against Muslim invader to save
the ever-cherished independence of his motherland. Once he had
given shelter to Mongol noblemen, he could never betray them
into the hands of their enemy. Hammir fought with sublime
courage, and upheld the noble traditions of the chivalrous
race to which he belonged. Ranthambhor had capitulated on
Tuesday, 11th July 1301 (3 Zilquda 700 H). Its fall had been
accelerated by the defection of Ranmal and Ratipal, two
ministers of Hammir. Ranmal, who had gone to Alauddin to
settle terms on behalf of the Rajputs, agreed to desert to the
Sultan, and obtained a written undertaking from him granting
him complete amnesty. Ranmal showed the document to his
Rajputs friends and some of them together with Ratipal left
the beleaguered garrison for the royal camp. But after
Alauddin had captured the fort, he punished the faithless
Rajputs, Ranmal and Ratipal, saying that when they had not
proved true to their old patron they could not be expected to
be faithful to him. But Just the contrary was the treatment he
accorded to Mir Muhammad Shah, whose wounds he ordered to be
dressed. Even in pangs of death, that valiant soldier spurned
the offer of attention. He openly insulted the Sultan for
which he was trampled under the feet of an elephant. But the
Sultan could never forget the bravery and integrity of the
Mongol. Noble and gave him a decent burial.
The surrender of Ranthambhor witnessed the usual zeal for
inconoclasticism and plunder. A number of temples, chief
amongst which was the temple of Yahar Deo (Har Deva), were
razed to the ground. Many “temples and houses in the city were
destroyed” and “the center of Kufr became the abode of Islam”.
The fortress of Ranthambhor together with the territory of
Jhain was entrusted to the care of Ulugh Khan, and the Sultan
returned to Delhi. After the collapse of the Chauhan
résistance at Ranthambhor, Alauddin Khalji got busy fighting
against the other states of Rajputana and against the Mongols
in Punjab and near Delhi. After the conquest of Malwa,
Alauddin sent his brilliant genera Malik Naib Kafur to the
south and he himself seized an opportunity to attack Scvana.
Sevana was then in possession of Parmar Rajput chief, Satal
Deva. Satal Deva had witnessed the mighty citadels of
Ranthambhor and Chittor succumb to onslaughts of the Khalji
warlord, but still he refused to submit to the Delhi Sultan.
Satal Deva was a powerful and energetic ruler, he had defeated
many Rais in battle and a number of Rajput Ravats acknowleged
his suzerainty. The Sultan marched on 2nd July, 1308 ( 13
Muharram, 708 H) to chastise the ruler of Sevana. On arrival
there, he began the investment of the fort. The right wing of
the royal army was stationed on two sides, east and west, of
the battlement; the left wing was on the north; and the center
was entrusted to the command of Malik Kamaluddin “the wolf.” A
constant shower off missiles was kept up from the manjniqs but
success was not in sight for a long time. The royal forces
resorted to many stratagems, but all in vain. The Rajputs
defended the fort stubbornly, threw fire and stone from the
battlement, and for months together “breath was choked, by the
sounds of the Turki flutes and Hindu bell”. When nothing
seemed to avail, says Padmanabh, a trick was resorted to. A
trait named Bhaile was induced to indicate a passage to the
royal commander through which a manjniq was carried and it
discharged a cow’s head into the lake which supplied water and
their fate sealed. The Imperial forces succeeded in escalating
the battlements of the citadel, but after great difficulty.
Satal Deva tried to Flee to Jalor, but ran into an ambush and
was done to death on 10th November, 1308 (23 Rabiul Avval,
708H) the administration of Sevana was entrusted to Kamaluddin
Gurg and Alauddin returned to Delhi.
Capture of Jalor
Now Alauddin Khalji attacked Kanhad Deva, the Chauhan Raja of
Jalor. Kanhad Deva, also known by the names of Saligram,
Gokalnath & Krishna III, was the son of Som Singh, a dependent
of the Solanki Bhim Deva of Gujarat. After Sultan Alauddin had
consolidated his authority in Marwar, Kanhad Deva’s
semi-independent status was construed as contumacy and, his
country was invaded. Nainsi described two sieges of Jalor by
Alauddin. The first occurred at the time of the royal army’s
return from Gujarat in 1298 and the second in 1311. As the
Sultan himself did not lead the forces to Gujarat, the details
given by Nainsi about the siege of 1298 may not be quite
accepted, as he always refers to king’s presence there.
Farishta also mentions about the expeditions to Jalor While
describing the events of the year 704 H (A.D. 1304) Farishta
writes that as the imperial general Alap Khan and Nusrat Khan
were returning from the conquest of Malwa, they arrived at
Jalor and Nahar Deo (Kanhad Deva), taking lesson from the fate
of Koka (of Malwa), offered his submission to the Sultan
without a show of resistance. The other invasion according to
Farishta came of in 1308 and was the outcome of a very curious
incident. One day while Kanhad was present in the court, he
heard Alauddin say that there was no one among the Hindu Rajas
who could dare challenge the might of his arms. The remarks
pricked Kanhad’s sense of pride and he picked up the gauntlet,
retorting, “If I wage a war and do not come out successful, I
may be killed”. This effrontery enraged the Sultan and he
ordered an invasion of Jalor, to which Kanhad had already
slipped to make preparation for war. Hajiuddhabir, a
cotemporary of Farishta, almost repeats the story, which
appears to be incredible. It is really strange that at one
time Kanhad Deva hurries to Delhi to pay homage to the king of
his own accord, professes unflinching obedience for four
years, and then suddenly adopts such an insolent attitude that
he puts himself and his subjects in extreme jeopardy. An
interesting reason has been given by Nainsi. He say that a
princess of Alauddins’s harem fell in love with Viram, son of
Kanhad Deva, who was on attendance at the court in place of
his father. Padmanabh in his Kanhadde Prbandh says that she
was a daughter of Sultan Alauddin and her name was Firoza. The
Sultan and the ladies of the harem first threatened the girl
to change her mind, but finding her adamant, Alauddin insisted
on Viram to marry her. The young Rajput could never think of
marrying a “Turk” girl and left for jalor, promising to return
with a wedding party (barat) after some time. The Sultan
suspected a ruse on the part of Viram and kept a Rajput prince
of the house as hostage. As was expected, Viram never returned
to marry the girl and the Sultan was so much incensed at his
treachery that he invaded Jalor. Neither the reasons given by
Nainsi nor by Farishta and Hajiuddabir are convincing. The
real cause of the invasion was in all certainly the
determination of the Sultan to put an end to the independence
of Jalor as was done with the other states of Rajputana. In
short, a royal force was sent to Jalor in A.D. 1311. The name
of the commander of the expedition is not known but he does
not seem to have been a brave general. The Rajputs defeated
the royalists in a number of engagements and threw them back
on many occasions. One thing is certain that the battle of
Jalor was terrible, and perhaps a prolonged one. According to
the Gujarati epic romance Kanhad de Prabhandh, the contest
continued for some years, and the imperialists met with a
number of reverses.
The news of the humiliating retreats put the Sultan to his
mettle and he sent a strong force under the veteran, Malik
Kamaluddin Gurg. On reaching Jalor, Kamaluddin pressed the
siege with unabated vigour. According to Padmanabh, one Sejwal
was tempted by royal gold to guide the royalists to a secret
entrance into the fort-Such meanness cost him his life at the
hands of his wife, but it facilitated the task of Kamaluddin.
At last Gokalnath, his son Viram Deva and their followers were
killed in a close combat and the fortress was captured.
Maldeva, a brother of Kanhad Deva, survived the massacre that
followed the fall of Jailor. Later on, he was able to secure
the goodwill of the Sultan, who appointed him to take charge
of Chittor from Khizra Khan. Nainsi’s date (1311 – 12 A.D.) of
the fall of Jalor is in conflict with that of Farishta (1308
A.D.) In 1308 the conquest of Sevana was undertaken and a
large army was sent to the Deccan also. It is, therefore,
probable that Jalor was attacked at a later date. But Nainsi’s
date find corroboration in the Tirtha Kalpa of Jina Prabha
Suri who says that in Sam vat 1367 i.e. 1310, Alauddin
destroyed the temple of Mahavira at Sanchor, a place near
Jalor. The destruction of this temple must have been a part of
large enterprise, namely the invasion of Jalor. Reu also
concludes that Jalor capitulated in A.D. 1311. it appears that
Jalor resisted the invasion for long, and fought for many
years before it capitulated. The brave Chauhans of Jalor had
kept up the tradition. To commemorate this victory, Alauddin
had a mosque erected in the famous fort of Songir at Jalor
which is still in existence. With the capitulation of Jalor,
almost all the leading states of Rajputana have been subdued
one after the other. Ever since Sultan Alauddin had embarked
upon the conquest of Ranthambhor in 1300, till the fall of
Jalor in 1311, his armies had constantly foutht in Rajasthan.
There was tough resistance to his attacks by all Rajputs (Chauhans
included) and the valour of Rajputs could not brook the insult
of giving way to the enemy. The result was that bloody battles
were fought before each and every fortress. To enumerate the
various wars in Rajputana, then, is to repeat the horrors of
blood and slaughter, of gallant fight, of glorious martyrdom.
Sometimes before a single citadel the contest prolonged for
years and ended in a general massacre of its population,
accompanied by the gruesome destruction of the womenfolk in
the fire of Jauhar.
Causes of Failure for Rajputs
Unluckily the Rajputs who spurned life without freedom,
possessed valour without the spirit of union. Individual
fortresses offered stubborn resistance, but singly none of
them was a match against the Sultanate of Delhi. Had even two
or three Rajput princes combined against the Sultan, they
would surely have succeeded in defeating him. But secure in
their citadels, each one of them was contend to mind his own
affairs and exert in his own pride, while Alauddin raided and
subdued one kingdom after another. The relations between
Sevana and Jalor are a glaring example of the callous
indifference the Rajput chieftains sometimes entertained
towards one another. While the fall of Sevana was imminent,
the ruler of Jalor, living only about fifty miles from there,
was unmoved, with the result that a couple of years Jalor was
also taken in another assault. Another reason of Rajput defeat
was their forts. They were generally constructed on the top of
a hillock and were designed to protect women, children and
cattle when the brave defenders sallied out to encounter a
sudden invasion. And although it was difficult for the
invaders to ascend, step-by-step, the steep cliffs of the
hillock, yet the citadel, when subjected to a siege, was
always cut off from the plains below. Thus the corns and
revenues of the outlying districts automatically fell into the
hands of the vicinity escaped in time to seek shelter inside
the citadel; a large number of them were left on the plains
below. Their distress made them hate enemy. The conditions
inside the fortress, again, were not very satisfactory. During
an investment, the crowed far exceeded the number of normal
inhabitants, and there were no special arrangements for extra
provisions and vegetables. The enemy, lying at the base of the
hill on which the fort stood, could easily cut of the convoy,
and it was always the dearth of provisions that rendered
defense impossible. The mighty fortress of Ranthambhor and
Jalor surrendered to famine – Again, medieval conditions of
sanitation were no preventive against outbreak of epidemics.
To add to this, caste considerations and orthodoxy reigned
supreme. The enemy was alive to these weaknesses of the Hindus
and took full advantage. The instances of Ranthambhor, Sevana
and Jalor are worth repeating. Through the services of some
traitor, cowhides were thrown inside the grain cellars, or
cow’s head in water reservoir. Provisions were thereby
rendered ‘desecrate’ and the fortresses surrendered.
The Rajput were still steeped in their age-long traditions of
warfare and had little opportunities of developing their
military strategy. They had little contacts with Central Asian
countries and were quite ignorant of the revolutionary changes
the Mongols had introduced in the art of warfare. Every now
and then, the Sultan of Delhi had to fight the Mongol invaders
and had adopted many of their tactics off ambuscade,
camouflage and feigning retreats. They possessed engines of
war like arrada, gargach and marjniq while the Rajputs fought
with huge elephants, in open engagements. Their government was
based on feudal principles and fixed quotas of soldiers were
provided by the various dependencies in time of war. During an
investment, such reinforcement could not always arrive because
off enemy activity and the beleaguered had to fight
single-handed. Moreover, the resources of a Rajput Raja were
limited. His country was barren; there was dearth of crops and
of water. His only fortune was the hilly nature of the
country. But how could he succeed against the Sultan of Delhi
who possessed the Punjab, Avadh and Gujarat, the most fertile
regions of the country, and who could depend upon an unlimited
supply of provisions and reinforcements. Furthermore, the
Rajput only knows how to die. To him death, on the field of
battle, was the greatest bliss, the highest honour. Chivalry
was crammed into his very nature, hatred trick and treachery.
As to the Turk, trickery was an important method of warfare.
To him, death was the greatest misfortune. He wanted to live
in this world and enjoy the fruits of victory. So victory he
must have, whatever the means he employed to obtain it. Thus,
while the Rajput flung himself into the battle, the Turk moved
after calculating the enterprise. The Rajput fought
desperately, the Turk strategically. Diplomacy among the
Rajputs was minimal, with the Muslims it was the very secret
of their success. But the success of the Sultan in Rajputana
was short lived. The Rajputs, who had a country to love and an
honour to defend, never gave away to Alauddin’s governors.
They knew well how to deliver themselves and their families
from the insulting invader, and soon as the deluge of the
invasions had ebbed out, they reclaimed their territories. The
result was that Alauddin’s hold over Rajputana was precarious
and the occupation of Ranthambhor after Ulugh Khan did not
last much. Jalor too become independent very soon after its
conquest. Bardic literature enumerates continuous struggles
between the Muslims and the Rajputs. Obviously Rajputana had
not completely submitted, and one or the other kingdom in the
land of born warriors, was always successful in resisting the
authority of the Sultanate of Delhi. |
